The dilemmas of a single-issue party: The UK Independence Party by Usherwood, S
Simon Usherwood 
Department of Political, International & Policy Studies 
University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, UK 
GU2 7XH 
S.Usherwood@surrey.ac.uk 
Tel: +44 (0)1483 – 68 9962 
Fax: +44 (0)1483 - 686208 
 
 
 
 
“The dilemmas of a single-issue party: The UK 
Independence Party” 
  
 
 
Biography 
Simon Usherwood is Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Political, International 
& Policy Studies at the University of Surrey, UK.  His main research interest is 
opposition to the European Union, particularly in the UK and France, with particular 
regard to the impact of institutional structures.  His work has been published in 
several journals and edited collections.
 1 
“The dilemmas of a single-issue party: The UK 
Independence Party” 1 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been one of the most successful single-issue 
parties in modern British political history.  With its central policy of withdraw from 
the European Union, UKIP was the third largest party in the 2004 European 
Parliament elections.  However, this article highlights the tensions that exist within 
the party, in terms of strategy, focus and even its objectives.  From its foundation in 
the early 1990s, the party has been placed in a position equivalent to the Fundi-Realo 
debate in the German Green party of the 1980s: does the party strive for ideological 
purity and singularity of purpose, or does it work within the system it professes to 
abhor?  The article considers the different pressures placed on the party, considering 
both environmental constraints placed on it by the institutional system and the internal 
ideological currents at play.  These internal and external factors help to explain the 
party’s dilemma and point towards some possible future paths. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Research on opposition to the European Union (EU) is soon to celebrate the first 
decade since the publication of Paul Taggart’s (1998) article in the European Journal 
of Political Research on euroscepticism as a touchstone of dissent.  Since then, there 
has been a veritable explosion of work, looking at countries and groups across Europe 
and at a wide variety of different theoretical approaches (see Flood & Usherwood 
2005 for an overview).  However, one of the more surprising omissions from this 
catalogue of research has been the UK Independence Party (UKIP): despite being one 
of the oldest and biggest and electorally most successfully anti-EU parties, there has 
been only indirect academic research and a couple of books, both written by insiders 
(Daniel 2006; Gardner 2006).  Such an omission is surprising, but perhaps reflects a 
certain unease on the part of researchers about how to deal with the party.  On the one 
hand, it is successful at the level of mobilising significant numbers of voters, resulting 
in a presence in the European Parliament (EP) since 1999.  On the other, it is weakly 
organised and riven by disputes.  Perhaps UKIP falls between two stools by being too 
small to be of interest as a party, but too big and too particular to be dealt with as a 
pressure group.  Moreover, its status as a single-issue party, for whom all policy 
preferences circle around withdrawal from the EU, marks it out as something of an 
anomaly in British politics.  Whatever the reasons, it will be argued that UKIP 
presents several aspects that are of interest to those studying the phenomenon of 
opposition to the EU.  In particular, the party’s experience since its formation in 1993 
highlights the importance of both environmental factors (in the form of institutional 
constraints) and of internal dynamics (in the form of personalities and ideologies) in 
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determining the course of events.  In this, UKIP is clearly not unique and the point 
will be made that all parties and pressure groups suffer the same tensions. 
 
Founded in 1993 by Alan Sked, a university lecturer who had been involved in the 
Bruges Group in its early 1990s heyday, UKIP was intended to contest elections in 
the EP and Westminster with a view to securing British withdrawal from the EU.  
After several years of unexceptional performance and competition with the 
Referendum Party in the 1997 general election, the party suffered major upheavals in 
1997 (when Sked resigned in the wake of allegations of infiltration by the British 
National Party (BNP) and disagreements with the National Executive (NEC)) and 
again in 1999 (when Sked’s replacement, Michael Holmes, and the NEC were sacked 
by the party following legal wrangles in the wake of the election of 3 MEPs under the 
new proportional representation system to the EP).  It was only under the leadership 
of Jeffrey Titford and then Roger Knapman that the party found more stability, 
broadening its policy base and gathering support for the 2004 EP elections.  These 
elections marked the high point of the party’s existence to date, with 12 MEPs and 
over 16% of the national vote.  However, almost immediately the party had to deal 
with the struggle by one of these MEPs, former television presenter Robert Kilroy-
Silk, to secure the leadership (in which he was unsuccessful) and with the party’s 
inability to maintain media interest in its policies.  The election of Nigel Farage, long 
a strong figure in the party, in late 2006 marked the start of an effort to mainstream 
UKIP into British political life. 
 
The primary argument of the paper is that UKIP finds itself having to resolve a 
tension that confronts all ostensibly single-issue parties.  This tension is the one that 
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lies between those who feel that the objective is fundamental to the nature of the party 
and cannot be compromised at any point, and those who accept a need to be flexible 
in the short-run, in order to have a better chance of achieving the objective in the 
longer-term.  This is usually referred to the Fundi-Realo split, after the names given to 
these two camps in the German Green Party in the 1980s (Paterson & Southern 1991).  
This basis dynamic has, it will be contended, driven much of the development of the 
party and explains much of the trouble that it seems to attract to itself. 
 
With this in mind, the article is structured as follows.  Firstly, there is a consideration 
of the institutional environment in which UKIP operates: this covers not only the 
party system for the EP and Westminster, but also its relations with the rest of the 
British anti-EU movement and with other politically-peripheral parties, particularly on 
the far-right.  The next section switches to the internal dynamics of the party, looking 
at the sub-currents of ideological thought and the somewhat opaque organisational 
structure.  The conclusion then draws together the external and internal perspectives, 
to develop and flesh out the ideas introduced above. 
 
 
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
This article is concerned with understanding how the external environment and 
internal pressures have shaped the work and objectives of UKIP.  This dual 
perspective builds on research on exploring and explaining the European issue 
(Hooghe 2007; Flood & Usherwood 2005) in a fashion that goes beyond simple (and 
simplistic) taxonomies.  What this research has stressed so far has been the necessity 
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of unpicking the detail of a group’s position on European integration, by exploring 
institutional and ideological factors.  It is this insight which informs the rest of the 
article.  Rather than divide the analysis between institutional and ideological 
elements, it is more useful to approach the matter with an internal/external split, to 
underline the interrelated nature of the factors under consideration.  As will be 
apparent, just as ideology is contained and constrained by institutional factors, so 
institutions are underpinned by ideological assumptions. 
 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL ARENAS 
The most obvious environmental factor has been the British electoral system, or more 
accurately, systems.  The difference between First-past-the-post (FPP) and 
Proportional Representation (PR) since 1999 has had a clear impact on party strategy: 
while the party aims to contest all elections at a national level, the structuring effects 
of the electoral systems result in more emphasis being placed on EP elections.  This is 
inevitably intertwined with consideration of a second factor, namely that of political 
arenas.  Despite the party’s core policy of withdrawal from the EU, and its consequent 
refusal to recognise the legitimacy or purpose of the EP, there is still an understanding 
that it represents the best opportunity to gain a profile.  This tension sits at the heart of 
the shifting policy on EP seats: Originally, the party had vowed not to take up any 
seats it might win, but with the replacement of Alan Sked in 1997, that policy 
changed to one of taking up seats in order to gather information to educate the public.  
Thus while there was an ideological pressure to not taking up EP seats, there was also 
a pragmatic, electoral one for contesting them, grounded in the higher prevalence of 
‘Europe’ as a motivating factor in voting (Franklin, 2001).  This contrasts with the 
experience of Sinn Féin, which has not taken up their seats in the UK Parliament on 
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grounds of principle, but which has access to other elected chambers in Northern 
Ireland and Eire.  The key point is that the barrier to accessing the EP is lower than 
that for the House of Commons: to a lesser extent, this has also been true of efforts to 
contest local elections, where turnout is much lower. 
 
The higher barrier to the House of Commons is constituted not only by the electoral 
system but also by the nature of the institution.  As the source of governmental power, 
it is the dominant political assembly in the British political system.  As a result, there 
is a voting dimension absent elsewhere, namely the relationship of the MP to the 
government: MPs are typically selected by voters on the basis of the party affiliation 
and the possibility of gaining power (Norton 2005).  In making this decision voters 
will consider the party’s programme and here UKIP suffers a distinct problem with its 
public profile as a single-issue party.  The Commons does not only deal with the 
European Union, but the full range of public policy and so any party contesting the 
formation of the next government is driven to present a wide-ranging manifesto, in 
order to demonstrate competence and to maximise votes (Downs 1957).  While there 
have been recent attempts to engage in such a widening of the party’s programme, 
most notably with the development from 2002 of an immigration and asylum policy 
modelling in part on ideas of Pym Fortuyn in the Netherlands, this remains an 
incomplete process.  This in turn partly explains the consistently poor performance of 
the party in both general elections and by-elections. 
 
These uneven barriers to political arenas is also reflected in the different approaches 
taken by the party.  This was particularly evident after Dick Morris offered his 
services to UKIP from 2003.  Gardner (2006, 190) notes that for the 2004 EP election, 
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the strategy was one of simply mobilising the large latent anti-EU vote that was 
already present in the electorate: the core message was simply “Say NO”, which 
would allow people to project whatever their discontents with the EU might be.  To 
this end, the party invested all possible resources in spreading its message across the 
country, spending £2.36 million (as against £3.13 million by the Conservatives and 
£1.71 million by Labour (Electoral Commission, 2004)).  By contrast, the 2005 
general election was fought on a basis of concentrating on a few seats where winning 
might be possible, with a view to using any success in those areas to help bolster the 
national campaign (Gardner 2006, 265). 
 
PARTY COMPETITION 
The second key environmental factor comes from competition with other parties.  
Naturally, this is related to the previous factor, since electoral systems have shaped 
the party system.  Once again, we see some difference between the party’s stance in 
EP and general elections. 
 
In the former, UKIP is able to present itself as a relevant party at the level of policy, 
as well as a focus of protest votes against Labour and the Conservatives.  In this, it is 
largely benefiting from the structural second-order effects that shape EP election 
voting (Rief & Schmidt 1980; Marsh 1998).  By contrast, in general elections it finds 
itself identified as occupying the same political space as the Conservatives, but with a 
much less ambiguous stance on the EU.  This then has manifested itself in UKIP’s 
efforts to highlight the substantive differences between itself and the Conservatives.  
In effect, much of this comes down to attacking the Tory line of “in Europe, not run 
by Europe” developed by William Hague as a means of holding together the various 
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factions within the party: in UKIP’s opinion, membership of the EU necessarily 
implies an acceptance of policy outputs, both politically and legally (Gardner 2006, 
143).  A second strand in differentiation from the Conservatives was the development 
of a second policy line on controlled immigration in the aftermath of the 2001 general 
election, to try and capitalise on the perceived reluctance of the main parties to 
discuss the issue.  Despite the risks of reinforcing the party’s profile as a quasi-far-
right grouping, policy was significantly hardened in 2003 (Gardner 2006, 177), only 
for the issue to be taken up by both Labour and the Conservatives a couple of years 
later, again closing down the distinctiveness of UKIP. 
 
If the relationship to the Conservatives has been presented as one of conflict, then that 
should not let us ignore the strong ties between the two parties.  Many UKIP members 
were previously Conservative members and it is tempting to consider UKIP as the 
anti-EU faction of the Conservative party, on both membership and ideological 
grounds.  That was the basis for UKIP’s ability to draw in votes during second-order 
elections from the Conservatives.  However, this relationship extends beyond this: 
several key donors to the party have swung between UKIP and the Conservatives.  A 
case in point here is Paul Sykes, a millionaire who had bank-rolled anti-Euro 
Conservative MPs in 1997, then helped support the Democracy Movement (the 
successor to the Referendum Party), before coming to fund UKIP in the 2001 general 
election and the 2004 EP elections.  While doing the latter, it was apparent that Sykes 
was engaged in an on-going relationship with the Conservatives, in the form of trying 
to get them to harden their position on the EU: things came to a head in October 2004, 
when Robert Kilroy-Silk stated at the party conference that he wanted to ‘”kill the 
Tories”, causing Sykes to withdraw funding, since only the Conservatives had a 
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“credible chance of forming an anti-EU government” (BBC 2004, Gardner 2006, 
240). 
 
The ambiguity of the relationship is also seen in the repeated discussions about 
electoral pacts.  On the one hand, UKIP has a pragmatic interest in gaining 
representation for itself, but on the other, it has an ideological interest in gaining 
representation for any MP opposed to membership of the European Union.  This 
tension has resulted in agreements with other minor parties, in order to avoid splitting 
the vote, but it is with the Conservatives that this has held the greatest potential.  
However, the Conservatives have consistently rebuffed UKIP, on the grounds that 
their MPs should not be beholden in some way to another party, even if fears of a 
potential split in the centre-right vote did have some audience (Bruges Group 2005).  
Clearly, underpinning this refusal to cooperation is a position of predominance and a 
lack of willingness to enhance the implied credibility of UKIP’s importance.  
Notwithstanding this, the continual movements (actual and threatened) of individuals 
between the parties does suggest that there is something of a meaningful overlap 
between the two parties’ constituencies. 
 
A final point to make in relation to party competition comes on the other side of the 
political space.  UKIP has been repeatedly accused of being infiltrated by far-right 
elements, in some cases with some grounds for justification (Searchlight 1997).  
Regardless of whether these accusations have all the substance claimed of them, the 
relationship to groups such as the British National Party or the National Front is a 
fraught one.  From the foundation of UKIP, there has been a continual effort by the 
leadership to stress their inclusiveness and non-racist nature.  At the same time, those 
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areas that the party has focused on (EU withdrawal and restrictions on immigration) 
are very close to the far-right.  Essentially, the issue is akin to the relationship with the 
Conservatives, in that UKIP find themselves wanting to differentiate themselves, but 
also wanting to gain votes and active members. 
 
 
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
 
Having sketched out the environment within which the party operates, we must 
unpack the internal processes at work in the party.  However, the focus is much more 
on the ideological aspect, although institutional considerations still play a part. 
 
IDEOLOGY 
At one level, UKIP’s ideology is very clear: opposition to the European Union.  At 
another, it is highly problematic.  The basic issue is that the party’s core ideological 
identity is placed around a negative definition: there is no clear agreement on why the 
party is opposed to the EU, less as to what should be the response to this opposition, 
and less still as to any other policy preferences. 
 
In the party’s early years, this was not a major issue, since it was relatively small, was 
not taken as a serious participant within elections (and so did not have to justify its 
position) and because it was able to feed off the visceral quality of euroscepticism, 
rather than the intellectual or ideological dimension.  However, with time the party 
has been forced by its expansion and its success to expand, explore and modify its 
policy.  The steps can represented as a progression from principled non-engagement 
 11 
(under Alan Sked), to pragmatic engagement (under Michael Holmes and Jeffrey 
Titford), to developing new policy lines and arenas of activity (under Roger 
Knapman), to recontextualising the entire opposition to the EU in a wide-ranging 
notion of ‘Independence’ (under Nigel Farage).  In this latest phase, the party has 
sought to develop a much more ambitious recasting of its public image and has tried 
to access new arenas of political debate.  As much as the party has pursued a line of 
withdrawal since its foundation, it has been happy to buy into a system that gives it a 
certain legitimacy through its MEPs, as well as funding, a small amount of which has 
supported other activities. 
 
This ambiguity of ideological programme has helped the party to respond to 
competition within the party system (see above), by giving it some flexibility.  But it 
has also left UKIP open to entryism: the far-right has already been discussed, but we 
might also consider the way in which relatively high-profile individuals such as 
Holmes or Kilroy-Silk used their power and profile within the party to take it in new 
directions.  That the party has been able to resist all of these incursions does 
demonstrate the limits to such tactics, but the simple fact of the attempts being made 
in the first place points to at least a perceived weakness of an ideological core.  
Ultimately, the tension comes from two very different pressures.  Firstly, UKIP’s 
members are relatively diverse, typically having left other political parties to express 
their particular frustration over European policy.  This pulls the party in a number of 
different ideological directions.  Secondly, UKIP has to respond to electoral 
necessities: by taking the path of being an office-seeking political party, it has to 
pursue votes.  In this case, the issue is only partly about the exact policy on the EU, 
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because that issue is low in most voters’ list of priorities.  Hence the party has to roll 
it up with other policies in order to make a sufficiently interesting package. 
 
The end-result has been the uneven development of a set of policies outside EU 
withdrawal, but still largely informed by it.  UKIP’s most recent set of manifestos 
(UKIP 2007a) provides a programme that talks about the economy, health, education 
and the other staples of British party politics, but all underpinned by a budget much 
enhanced from non-membership of the EU.  In this way, the party is able to square the 
circle of cutting back state interference in peoples’ lives and increasing spending on 
public services.  Such ideas have been around for some thing within the anti-EU 
movement (e.g. Burkitt et al, 1996), but they remain essentially populist in their 
opportunistic (rather than principled) use of extra resources. 
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PARTY STRUCTURE 
UKIP’s party structure has also played a role in the changing fortunes of the party.  
While Sked had produced a complete constitutional document for the founding of the 
party, it has proved to be problematic.  Firstly, it was a document for a more mature 
party than UKIP, and presupposed a certain stability within the membership and 
leadership which was not actually there: most obviously, the NEC was relatively 
large, and it has only been in recent years that there has not been a problem in finding 
individuals to take up posts.  Consequently, more radical elements have found it easy 
to access positions of power, with a resultant instability.  The text also has several 
lacunae of procedure and powers, resulting in at least three separate instances where 
extensive legal advice has been sought by competing groups, which in turn has 
undermined the constitution’s status.  That these instances have all revolved around 
the status and powers of the party leadership (Sked and Holmes’ arguments with the 
NEC in 1997 and 1998 respectively; Kilroy-Silk’s challenge for the leadership in 
2001) has merely made the problem more obvious. 
 
The tensions between the leadership and membership have also been noted.  
Particularly once UKIP started to win elected offices, those individuals have had 
access to much more reliable funding for their activities, largely outside the control of 
the party.  Because much of the membership is passive, power inevitably accrues to 
the centre, only to produce the personality and policy clashes already noted.  A case in 
point has been the tension between the NEC and the party’s MEPs, who have taken up 
much of the party’s resources, which was to result in the resignation of the party 
chair, Petrina Holdsworth, in 2005.  This tension has been enhanced by the rise of the 
‘chequebook politics’ of which Sked had criticised James Goldsmith’s Referendum 
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Party in 1996: the party is reliant on a small number of bigger supporters for much of 
its financing, with the resultant influence that produces.  Consequently, their 
opposition to the current review of party funding is rather unsurprising (UKIP 2007b). 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has argued that UKIP is a party in flux, whether it is considered 
ideologically, organisationally or in its tactics and strategy.  In this, it has been shaped 
by a set of internal and external constraints, in the same way as any other party or 
pressure group.  How then can this be pulled together? 
 
At the heart of the matter is UKIP’s status as a single-issue party.  Its party-ness 
compels it towards certain practices, which are more or less compatible with its single 
issue.  We might therefore look to similar parties for useful analytical frameworks.  
Of these, the one that seems most readily applicable is the experience of the German 
Green party: while not a single-issue party in the same sense, this was a political party 
emerging from a broader set of activities in civil society, struggling to reconcile 
different tensions (Rüdig 2005).  In the case of the Greens, this was expressed as a 
Fundi-Realo split.  The Fundis held a position of comprehensive rejection of the 
political system, while the Realos took the view that there had to be some engagement 
with the existing system and actors in order to change them (Paterson & Southern 
1991): thus the core issue was one of flexibility of means to achieve an ultimate 
objective.  In the German case, it was the Realos that won out, taking the party into 
the Bundestag and eventually into national government.  Paterson & Southern (1991, 
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215-6) suggest this was possible because the internal tensions were compensated for 
by the rising profile of environmental issues in political debate from the 1970s and the 
highly educated and motivated social groups that supported them. 
 
Transposing this to UKIP, we note several points.  Firstly, the Fundi-Realo split has 
also been present in UKIP, most obviously at the end of the Sked era in 1996-7, when 
the policy on EP seats was changed.  However, it has also resurfaced with the 
expansion of the party’s programme outside of EU withdrawal.  In one notable 
example, NEC member Damian Hockney (later to be UKIP’s London mayoral 
candidate) invested much time into fighting what he perceived to be a shift in the core 
policy of the party: in 2003, election leaflets were drawn up with the slogan “No to 
European Union”, which seemed to imply something different to the “No to the 
European Union” that had been used before (Ukipuncovered 2004).  Hockney claimed 
that this was driven by the party leadership in response to (unpublished) polling data.  
Given its position as the only electorally significant party with a policy of withdrawal 
from the EU, UKIP is likely to continue to have members who are members precisely 
for that reason, which in turn will perpetuate the tension.  This leads to a second point 
of comparison, namely the tensions between leadership and membership.  In both 
cases, it has been the former that has led to shift to realism, unsurprisingly given their 
different perspective.  Party leaderships are directly involved in the party political 
system and in the management of their party, thus predisposing them to a pragmatic 
understanding of how politics is done.  Memberships, by contrast, are interested in the 
issue that the party is campaigning for and want that issue to be addressed as quickly 
and directly as possible. 
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Clearly, UKIP is not completely like the Greens.  Firstly, it lacks the wider social 
support the Greens did: the issue of Europe enjoyed a period of relatively high public 
interest in the 1990s, but that is no longer the case (to use Gardner’s (2006, 274) 
phrase, Europe was “the penny that didn’t drop” for the British electorate, even after 
the 2004 EP elections).  Likewise, the electoral base for UKIP appears much more 
contingent than the Greens’ did, for the simple reason that UKIP is a relatively 
traditional centre-right party, whereas the Greens were able to appeal to a more 
general insecurity in its voters (Betz, 1990).  Perhaps most significantly, UKIP 
negative ideological core makes a Fundi-type position very difficult to maintain, since 
each person has a set of positive political values and positions that construct the 
negative position of withdrawal. 
 
A second comparison we might make is with the far-right parties in the UK that UKIP 
has made such efforts to hold at arm’s length.  The British National Party (BNP) and 
the National Front (NF) both hold similar views to UKIP on the EU, but framed by an 
explicit xenophobia and nationalism.  Again, both parties have experienced deep 
internal divisions about the best methods to achieving political influence, broadly on 
Fundi-Realo lines (Copsey, 2004).  However, the far-right’s construction around a 
positive ideological core of nationalism has meant that it practice there has been more 
scope to accommodate such tensions.  Nationalism is not policy-specific, in the way 
withdrawal from the EU is, so the far-right has been much more comfortable with 
developing a broad (if still lop-sided) set of policy stances that can evolve and adapt 
to changing circumstances.  Indeed, opposition to the EU is just such a case, having 
emerged as a specific policy commitment in the early 1990s in response to the raised 
profile of the EU in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty.  Such adaptability has allowed 
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for internal power struggles to exist at the level of individual personalities, without 
compromising the essential identity of the far-right. 
 
One option for UKIP to follow would be something much like the Danish People’s 
Movement.  Founded in the run-up to Danish accession in 1972, the Movement only 
contests EP elections on a policy of withdrawal, being in an electoral pact with other 
parties who do not put up candidates.   The left-wing Movement has strong links with 
the anti-EU movement in Denmark and beyond, and aims to pursue educational 
projects to raise awareness of the problems with the EU (see People’s Movement 
2007). In this way, it maximises its impact, it sidesteps much political competition 
and helps generate wider effects. 
 
However, UKIP looks unlikely to follow such a strategy.  Firstly, the People’s 
Movement demonstrates the limitations of a negative ideological core through its 
overshadowing since the early-1990s by the June Movement, led by Jens Peter Bonde, 
which talks about major reform of the EU and has articulated more progressive policy 
alternatives than the People’s Movement, which have been more appealing to Danish 
voters, the large majority of whom do not wish to leave the EU (Raunio, 2007).  
Secondly, the central individuals within UKIP’s history have been much more 
ambitious.  Kilroy-Silk is the clearest example of this, but it has also been true in a 
more limited of Sked, Holmes and Farage, each of whom has sought to cast or recast 
the party in their own image.  Thirdly, the long-term trend of British public opinion 
since the late 1990s has been to consign European integration to an ever-lower place 
in the ranking of political issues (see Mori, 2007), which makes it more than likely 
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that the broadening of UKIP’s policy base will have to continue if the party is to keep 
its relevance in public eyes. 
 
Ultimately, the most striking aspect of UKIP’s development is that after 13 years of 
existence, the fighting of 3 general elections, 3 EP elections, over 30 by-elections, 3 
major party schisms and numerous minor spats, the party still does not have a clear 
direction and purpose.  The continuing evolution of the party’s programme and the 
fractious plays for power have meant that the party remains a rather contingent 
organisation.  With the Greens’ experience in mind, we might expect yet more change 
to come. 
 
 
                                                 
Endnotes: 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Political Studies Association 57
th
 
Annual Conference, 11 to 13 April 2007, Bath, and at the Sussex European 
Institute’s seminar series, 24 April 2007. Many thanks are due to comments 
from Paul Taggart, Aleks Szczerbiak, Wolfgang Rüdig, Tim Bale, two 
anonymous referees and others. 
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